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To SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND 
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868. By .Donald G. Nieman. 
Millwood, N.Y.: KTO Press. 1979. Pp. xvii, 250. $19.95. 
Unpopular laws rarely work. Nowhere has this proven more true 
than in the history of civil rights. Over ten years after the upheavals 
of the 1960s - a quarter century after Brown v. Board ef Education 1 
- a disproportionate number of blacks still live in segregated neigh-
borhoods, attend inadequate schools, and work in menialjobs.2 The 
"sorry history of discrimination"3 continues despite all that the Gov-
ernment and the courts have done to arrest its progress. A lesson for 
the present may lie in this history: without popular support, legal 
remedies can achieve only partial success. 4 
Professor Nieman's5 monograph explores an early chapter in this 
sorry history, the unsuccessful first attempt by the federal govern-
ment to secure legal rights for blacks. One month before the end of 
the Civil War, Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freed-
men, and Abandoned Lands. Southern blacks sorely needed the Bu-
reau's protection. Southern laws made them little more than slaves. 
Self-styled "regulators" assaulted them at will. Every southern state 
foreclosed effective judicial relief by prohibiting them from testifying 
against whites. Other, less direct restrictions also prevented them 
from asserting their rights. Lawyers' fees, court costs, and statutory 
bonds all required money that blacks, like many whites, simply did 
not have. Judges did little to encourage black plaintiffs. On one ap-
parently typical occasion, a southern magistrate summarily dis-
missed a black's complaint after declaring in open court that he had 
not been elected "to attend to a damn lot of niggers" (pp. 128, 201). 
If blacks were to enjoy any rights at all beyond simple freedom de 
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
2. q. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 395 (1978) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting and concurring) ("Measured by any benchmark of comfort or achievement, meaning-
ful equality remains a distant dream for the Negro."). 
3. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,396 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting 
and concurring). 
4. Busing to achieve school desegregation provides a case in point. Compare Keyes v. 
School Dist. No. l, 413 U.S. 189, 238, 243-44 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (busing an occa-
sionally useful remedy), with Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449,483 (1979) (Pow-
ell, J., dissenting) (busing now a useless remedy because "[t]he process of resegregation, 
stimulated by resentment against judicial coercion and concern as to the effect of court super-
vision of education, will follow today's decisions as surely as it has in other cities subjected to 
similar sweeping [busing] decrees"). 
5. Professor Nieman is Assistant Professor of History at Kansas State University. 
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Jure, support had to come from the federal government. To provide 
this support, the Bureau established courts of limited jurisdiction, 
alerted military commanders of civil rights violations, and conducted 
labor negotiations between planters and their former slaves.6 
Professor Nieman's "impressionistic analysis" (p. 31 n.25) indi-
cates that while the Bureau's courts did have many small successes, 
they generally "fell far short of providing ... [blacks with] adequate 
legal protection" (p. 11 ). Even in the halcyon days of the summer of 
1865, the Bureau's courts could not hope to find and try all those 
who deprived blacks of their rights (pp. 1.1-24). And they ceased 
operation within a year because President J(?hnson wanted to end 
martial law as soon as possible (p. 19). 
In its remaining two years, the Bureau unsuccessfully sought to 
protect blacks from the maladministration of southern laws. But if 
local courts and officials refused to act, or acted unfairly, the Bureau 
could do nothing (pp. 135, 203, 208-09). A district military com-
mander could wholly undermine an agent's authority by failing to 
support him in disputes with local officials (pp. 207-09). By the end 
of 1866, when the military had become especially short-staffed as a 
result of the post-war demobilization, southern courts and law en-
forcement officers could safely act as though the Bureau did not exist 
(pp. 202-09). 
The Bureau enjoyed somewhat greater success in mediating labor 
disputes between planters and the freedmen, but it did so largely 
because it established a contract-labor system that was slavery's 
identical twin (pp. 189-90, 221). Contracts negotiated under the Bu-
reau's auspices bound blacks for an entire year to labor for white 
plantation owners under the "supervision of overseers and drivers" 
according to rules "usual and common for . . . slaves heretofore" (p. 
171). Professor Nieman concludes that the Bureau's agents were too 
few in the field (p. 133), too weakly supported in Washington,7 and 
too strongly opposed by white southerners to have given blacks any 
real help in dealing with the planters. In this recipe for failure, the 
paternalistic, even condescending attitude of Bureau officials was 
only a minor ingredient (p. ix). Professor Nieman's point here is a 
conventional one: without the direct aid of a larger army than Con-
6. Although at first unclear, the Bureau's responsibilities eventually included: (I) giving 
food and medical aid to refugees; (2) distributing abandoned land to homeless blacks; (3) 
aiding education; (4) conducting labor negotiations between planters and their former slaves; 
and (5) establishing courts of limited jurisdiction and other procedures to help blacks. See J. 
FRANKLIN, RECONSTRUCTION! AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 36-38 (1961). 
7. Professor Nieman notes that Andrew Johnson firmly opposed granting to blacks any-
thing that even resembled equal rights. Pp. 18-20, 115. 
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gress was willing to provide, no Bureau could have secured equal 
rights for blacks in the Reconstruction South. 8 
Although Professor Nieman supports these conclusions with ex-
tensive archival research, To Set the Law in Motion remains painful 
to read. Both the prose and the year-by-year, state-by-state organi-
zation of most of the book distract the reader. Combined with ellip-
tical summaries of some of the more interesting points, the mass of 
seemingly irrelevant detail inherent in such an artificial arrangement 
prevents the reader from assessing the book's importance. Part of 
the problem is that Nieman has not identified his audience. Does he 
write for the general reader, the specialist in Reconstruction history, 
or the legal historian? For the first, the book provides insufficient 
general background; for the second, the book fails to indicate what 
relation it bears to the historiography of the Reconstruction. This 
period has elsewhere been called "the bloody battleground of Amer-
ican historians."9 Its historiography is important. A narrowly 
drawn monograph such as Professor Nieman's should ordinarily 
place its insights in perspective by identifying which of the principal 
findings are new and how they alter previously accepted doctrine. 
The legal historian, however, may provide his own perspective. 
Though the book has little to offer the general reader, scholars inter-
ested in the early history of civil rights will find in Professor Nie-
man's book a fascinating case study in the failure of purely legal 
remedies. 10 
8. See, e.g., J. FRANKLIN, supra note 6, at 32-39. 
9. Boorstin, Preface to J. FRANKLIN, supra note 6, at vii. 
10. Three reviews of To Set the Law in Motion have appeared. See Gillette, Book Review, 
46 J.S. HIST. 444 (1980); Perman, Book Review, 67 J. AM. HIST. 419 (1980); Westwood, Book 
Review, 80 CoLUM. L. REV. 204 (1980). 
